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Apache NuttX

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
12
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://nuttx.apache.org

Products and areas 11

  • Board support packages, peripheral drivers and the in-tree wireless stacks covering Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and modem interfaces
  • Memory management, covering the heap allocator, the MMU and MPU configuration paths and the address environment machinery meant to separate processes
  • Network applications shipped in the apps tree, including the web server, the FTP and Telnet daemons, DHCP and the NSH shell reachable over serial or over the network
  • The binary loader and its ELF, NXFLAT and module-loading paths, which read code an attacker may have placed on storage
  • The C library and POSIX compatibility layer, where string, printf and locale handling process data that arrived over the network
  • The crypto and TLS integration paths that constrained applications rely on for confidentiality
  • The filesystem layer and every filesystem driver in the tree: FAT, littlefs, SmartFS, ROMFS, the NFS client and the procfs and binfs pseudo-filesystems
  • The kernel: scheduling, task and thread management, signals, message queues, and the system call boundary between user and kernel mode in protected and kernel builds
  • The NuttX network stack end to end: IPv4 and IPv6, TCP, UDP, ICMP, the socket layer, and the 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4 paths used on low-power radios
  • The published policy asks for security issues by private mail to the project security list and rules out GitHub issues and the public dev list. It draws no boundary narrower than the NuttX tree itself, and the ASF vulnerability handling policy governs from there
  • USB device and host stacks, including the CDC, MSC and composite classes that parse descriptors from the other end of the cable
Out of scope (6)
  • Board configurations an integrator wrote that deliberately enable a debug shell or an unauthenticated network service
  • Defects that exist only in an out-of-tree driver or board port
  • Downstream forks and vendor distributions built on NuttX. Xiaomi Vela, Sony's Spresense SDK and PX4 carry their own trees and their own processes
  • Physical attacks on a device an attacker already holds, including reading flash over a debug port
  • Reports filed as GitHub issues or on the public dev list, which the policy rules out by name for security issues
  • Third-party libraries pulled in by an application, unless NuttX's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Report privately to the project security mailing list at the address on the policy page , the channel the SECURITY.md names
  • Do not open a GitHub issue and do not mail the dev list; the policy states in capitals that both are public
  • Name the architecture and the board configuration you reproduced on.
  • Say whether you were in a flat build, a protected build or a kernel build, since the privilege boundary only exists in the latter two
  • hold detail until the announcement is out

Not accepted

  • Reports filed as GitHub issues or on the public dev list
  • Board configurations an integrator wrote that deliberately enable a debug shell or an unauthenticated network service
  • Third-party libraries pulled in by an application, unless NuttX's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable
  • Defects that exist only in an out-of-tree driver or board port
  • Physical attacks on a device an attacker already holds, including reading flash over a debug port

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Apache NuttX is a POSIX-style RTOS for microcontrollers, and its install base is far wider than its repository suggests. Xiaomi Vela, the operating system across Xiaomi's connected-device fleet, is built on it. Sony's Spresense boards run it, and so does the PX4 autopilot stack that flies a large share of research and commercial drones. A flaw in the kernel or the network stack lands on hardware that ships once and is rarely reflashed, so the exposure window is the product's service life rather than a patch cycle. The Apache Software Foundation runs a volunteer security process and no bug bounty, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The published policy asks for security issues by private mail to the project security list and rules out GitHub issues and the public dev list. It draws no boundary narrower than the NuttX tree itself, and the ASF vulnerability handling policy governs from there The kernel: scheduling, task and thread management, signals, message queues, and the system call boundary between user and kernel mode in protected and kernel builds Memory management, covering the heap allocator, the MMU and MPU configuration paths and the address environment machinery meant to separate processes The NuttX network stack end to end: IPv4 and IPv6, TCP, UDP, ICMP, the socket layer, and the 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4 paths used on low-power radios Network applications shipped in the apps tree, including the web server, the FTP and Telnet daemons, DHCP and the NSH shell reachable over serial or over the network The filesystem layer and every filesystem driver in the tree: FAT, littlefs, SmartFS, ROMFS, the NFS client and the procfs and binfs pseudo-filesystems The binary loader and its ELF, NXFLAT and module-loading paths, which read code an attacker may have placed on storage USB device and host stacks, including the CDC, MSC and composite classes that parse descriptors from the other end of the cable Board support packages, peripheral drivers and the in-tree wireless stacks covering Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and modem interfaces The C library and POSIX compatibility layer, where string, printf and locale handling process data that arrived over the network The crypto and TLS integration paths that constrained applications rely on for confidentiality Out of scope Downstream forks and vendor distributions built on NuttX. Xiaomi Vela, Sony's Spresense SDK and PX4 carry their own trees and their own processes Reports filed as GitHub issues or on the public dev list, which the policy rules out by name for security issues Board configurations an integrator wrote that deliberately enable a debug shell or an unauthenticated network service Third-party libraries pulled in by an application, unless NuttX's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable Defects that exist only in an out-of-tree driver or board port Physical attacks on a device an attacker already holds, including reading flash over a debug port Most-valued findings The research behind this entry records no published NuttX advisories to prioritise from, because the ASF announces through its own channel rather than GitHub, so what follows ranks by reachability rather than by history Pre-authentication memory corruption in the network stack, reachable from a packet on the local network before any application code runs Anything in the 6LoWPAN, IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth reception path, where an attacker needs only radio range and no credential at all System call boundary defects in protected and kernel builds, where a user task crosses into kernel address space through the only privilege separation NuttX offers Filesystem and binary-loader parsing bugs reached from removable storage or an update payload, the path taken by an attacker with brief physical access USB descriptor parsing in the device and host stacks, reachable by plugging something in Command injection or weak authentication in the NSH shell and the apps network daemons, which shipped products frequently leave enabled Anything that writes to flash or survives a reset, since much of this fleet has no field update mechanism and the finding stays live for the product's service life Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to the project security mailing list at [email protected] , the channel the SECURITY.md names Do not open a GitHub issue and do not mail the dev list; the policy states in capitals that both are public GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on apache/nuttx, in line with ASF projects routing off GitHub by policy, so the advisory button is not an option here The Apache Vulnerability Handling Policy governs from there, so expect ASF-paced coordination rather than a GitHub advisory workflow Name the architecture and the board configuration you reproduced on. NuttX builds differ enormously between targets and a defect may only be reachable in some configurations Say whether you were in a flat build, a protected build or a kernel build, since the privilege boundary only exists in the latter two The ASF is a volunteer organisation and states that it runs no bug bounty, so there is no payment to negotiate upstream Disclosure Coordinated through the ASF vulnerability handling process: the security list triages the report, a fix lands in the tree, and an announcement follows a release. The project does not publish through GitHub Security Advisories, so the advisory count on apache/nuttx understates the real record and should not be read as a measure of activity. Expect the embargo to run to the next release rather than to a fixed day count, and hold detail until the announcement is out. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability