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Apache Hive

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://hive.apache.org

Products and areas 12

  • Authentication across both services: Kerberos, LDAP, PAM and custom providers, along with impersonation and delegation-token handling
  • Authorisation in every mode the project ships, including SQL standard authorisation and storage-based authorisation, and the integration points where an external authorizer is consulted
  • Execution on the underlying engines, covering how a compiled plan reaches the cluster and what it is allowed to do there
  • File format and serialisation handling: ORC, Parquet, Avro, text formats and every reader that opens a file the query planner pointed at
  • HiveServer2 in full: the Thrift and HTTP transports, session handling, the JDBC and ODBC surface and the operations a client can invoke
  • The HCatalog and WebHCat REST surface, and any other HTTP endpoint the distribution exposes
  • The Hive Metastore Thrift API in full, including every metadata operation, the backing database access underneath it and the code that trusts a caller's identity
  • The Metastore schema tools, the beeline client and the JDBC driver the project ships
  • The project publishes a threat model naming its trust boundaries, and a SECURITY.md that routes reports through the ASF process to the project security list while ruling out public issues and pull requests. Those two documents define what the maintainers accept, and everything below sits inside them
  • The query and UDF execution layer, including user-defined functions, custom serialisation handlers and the mechanism that loads a JAR named by a session
  • The query compiler and optimizer, covering parsing, view expansion and how privileges are resolved against the objects a query touches
  • The web interfaces exposed by the services and everything reachable from them
Out of scope (6)
  • A cluster deliberately run without authentication or with impersonation disabled, which the threat model treats as a deployment decision
  • Hadoop, Ranger, the underlying object stores and the relational database behind the Metastore, where Hive is only the client
  • Recurring non-findings the project's threat model already records, and adversaries it places outside its trust boundaries
  • Scanner and fuzzer output with no demonstrated crossing of a trust boundary
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Hive's own use of the dependency makes them reachable
  • Vendor distributions such as Cloudera CDP or a cloud provider's managed Hive, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the Apache release

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Report privately to the address on the policy page , the project's own security list.
  • Do not open public GitHub issues or pull requests for security reports.
  • Read THREAT_MODEL.md first.
  • Show the trust boundary your finding crosses or expect it to be closed
  • Say whether the finding is in HiveServer2, the Metastore or the execution layer, and whether it needs an authenticated SQL session.
  • hold the detail until the upstream release is announced

Not accepted

  • Recurring non-findings the project's threat model already records, and adversaries it places outside its trust boundaries
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Hive's own use of the dependency makes them reachable
  • Scanner and fuzzer output with no demonstrated crossing of a trust boundary
  • Scanner output, fuzzer crashes and AI-generated reports get measured against that threat model

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 4 Last 12 months Auth/access control 35 % Remote code execution 30 % Info disclosure 20 % Input validation 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Apache Hive is the SQL warehouse layer over Hadoop and object storage, and the Hive Metastore is the catalog nearly every other engine reads. Spark, Trino, Impala, Flink and Iceberg deployments resolve tables through it, and it ships inside AWS EMR, Google Dataproc, Azure HDInsight and Cloudera CDP. Whoever controls the Metastore controls where all of those engines think the data lives. Four CVEs landed in the past year, two of them high and shared with Impala. Hive runs a dedicated security list and publishes a threat model, and the Apache Software Foundation states that as a volunteer organisation it has no bug bounty. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The project publishes a threat model naming its trust boundaries, and a SECURITY.md that routes reports through the ASF process to the project security list while ruling out public issues and pull requests. Those two documents define what the maintainers accept, and everything below sits inside them HiveServer2 in full: the Thrift and HTTP transports, session handling, the JDBC and ODBC surface and the operations a client can invoke The Hive Metastore Thrift API in full, including every metadata operation, the backing database access underneath it and the code that trusts a caller's identity Authentication across both services: Kerberos, LDAP, PAM and custom providers, along with impersonation and delegation-token handling Authorisation in every mode the project ships, including SQL standard authorisation and storage-based authorisation, and the integration points where an external authorizer is consulted The query compiler and optimizer, covering parsing, view expansion and how privileges are resolved against the objects a query touches The query and UDF execution layer, including user-defined functions, custom serialisation handlers and the mechanism that loads a JAR named by a session Execution on the underlying engines, covering how a compiled plan reaches the cluster and what it is allowed to do there File format and serialisation handling: ORC, Parquet, Avro, text formats and every reader that opens a file the query planner pointed at The HCatalog and WebHCat REST surface, and any other HTTP endpoint the distribution exposes The Metastore schema tools, the beeline client and the JDBC driver the project ships The web interfaces exposed by the services and everything reachable from them Out of scope Recurring non-findings the project's threat model already records, and adversaries it places outside its trust boundaries Hadoop, Ranger, the underlying object stores and the relational database behind the Metastore, where Hive is only the client A cluster deliberately run without authentication or with impersonation disabled, which the threat model treats as a deployment decision Vendor distributions such as Cloudera CDP or a cloud provider's managed Hive, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the Apache release Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Hive's own use of the dependency makes them reachable Scanner and fuzzer output with no demonstrated crossing of a trust boundary Most-valued findings Anything in the Metastore that lets a caller read or change metadata it has no right to. The Metastore is the catalog for Spark, Trino, Impala, Flink and Iceberg as well as Hive, so a defect there redirects engines that never ran a line of Hive code Authorisation bypass at the HiveServer2 front door: a session reading a table, a column or a view the authorizer should have refused Any path from SQL to code execution on a cluster node, including UDF and serialisation-handler loading that pulls a JAR from a location the caller controls. This is the most direct route from analyst access to cluster compromise The class the recent high-severity pair CVE-2025-10702 and CVE-2025-10703 landed in. Both were shared with Impala, so defects in the shared metadata and authorisation path are worth double the attention Impersonation and delegation-token defects, where a service acts as a user it should not be able to become Arbitrary file read or write reached through table locations, external table definitions or a serialisation handler pointed at a path outside the warehouse Disclosure of the credentials the services hold for object storage and for the Metastore database Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] , the project's own security list. Hive is one of the few ASF projects with a dedicated alias rather than only the foundation-wide address Do not open public GitHub issues or pull requests for security reports. The SECURITY.md rules that out explicitly Read THREAT_MODEL.md first. It names the trust boundaries, states which adversaries are in and out of scope, and lists the recurring non-findings the maintainers are tired of receiving Scanner output, fuzzer crashes and AI-generated reports get measured against that threat model. Show the trust boundary your finding crosses or expect it to be closed There is no money at any severity. The ASF runs no bug bounty as a foundation-wide position Say whether the finding is in HiveServer2, the Metastore or the execution layer, and whether it needs an authenticated SQL session. The Metastore is reachable from engines that are not Hive, so that answer changes the blast radius Disclosure Handled under the ASF process through the project's own security list: a private report, a fix developed under embargo, then a public advisory and a CVE alongside the release carrying it. Hive publishes through the ASF and NVD rather than as GitHub advisories, so do not expect a GHSA on the mirror. Distribution vendors backport Hive fixes on their own schedules, so hold the detail until the upstream release is announced. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability