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Apache Impala

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://impala.apache.org

Products and areas 12

  • Authentication in every supported mode, covering Kerberos, LDAP, TLS configuration and delegation-token handling
  • Authorisation and its integration with an external policy provider, including how a cached policy decision is refreshed and what happens when the cache is stale
  • Impersonation and proxy-user handling, where the engine executes work on behalf of somebody else
  • Scratch directory and spill-to-disk handling, and the credentials held for object storage
  • The catalog service and the state store, including what each accepts from the other daemons and how metadata changes propagate
  • The client-facing interfaces in full: the Thrift protocols, the HTTP transport and the JDBC and ODBC surface built on them
  • The coordinator and executor roles of the query daemon, including query planning, code generation and execution
  • The metadata path through the Hive Metastore, including everything Impala trusts from metadata it did not create
  • The per-daemon debug web interfaces and everything reachable from them, including the query profiles and logs they expose
  • The repository's SECURITY.md is a security threat model rather than an intake policy, so the declared scope is the trust boundaries it sets out, and reports go to the ASF-wide security address. Read that document first and treat everything below as sitting inside it
  • The scan layer and every file format reader: Parquet, ORC, Avro, text and the compression codecs behind them, all running as native code over files a user can place in a table location
  • User-defined functions, covering both the native and the JVM paths and the loading of a binary named by a session
Out of scope (6)
  • A cluster deliberately run without authentication or with the debug web interfaces published to an untrusted network, which is a deployment decision
  • Adversaries and scenarios the project's own threat model places outside its trust boundaries
  • Cloudera's distribution and its platform-specific patches, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the Apache release
  • Hadoop, Ranger, the Hive Metastore and the object stores Impala reads, where Impala is only the client
  • Resource exhaustion from a query the cluster was sized for
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Impala's own use of the dependency makes them reachable

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Report privately to the address on the policy page , Impala's listed contact in the ASF project directory. Name Impala clearly in the subject
  • Read the repository's SECURITY.md before you start.
  • Do not open a public GitHub issue or pull request describing the vulnerability before the fixed release ships
  • Say which daemon the finding lands on and whether it needs an authenticated session.
  • Check whether the finding also reproduces against Hive.
  • Give the file that triggers it where the bug is in a reader.

Not accepted

  • Adversaries and scenarios the project's own threat model places outside its trust boundaries
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Impala's own use of the dependency makes them reachable
  • Resource exhaustion from a query the cluster was sized for

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months Auth/access control 35 % Memory safety 30 % Info disclosure 20 % Code execution 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Apache Impala is the MPP SQL engine inside Cloudera's data platform, and that places it in a large number of on-premises estates in regulated industries. Its mirror repository carries few stars and that number says nothing useful about the deployment. Impala executes queries in C++ over Parquet and ORC files in HDFS or object storage, taking metadata from the Hive Metastore and authorisation from Ranger. Both CVEs published in the past year rated high, and both were shared with Hive. The Apache Software Foundation has no bug bounty as a matter of policy and Impala appears on no bounty platform. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The repository's SECURITY.md is a security threat model rather than an intake policy, so the declared scope is the trust boundaries it sets out, and reports go to the ASF-wide security address. Read that document first and treat everything below as sitting inside it The coordinator and executor roles of the query daemon, including query planning, code generation and execution The catalog service and the state store, including what each accepts from the other daemons and how metadata changes propagate The client-facing interfaces in full: the Thrift protocols, the HTTP transport and the JDBC and ODBC surface built on them Authentication in every supported mode, covering Kerberos, LDAP, TLS configuration and delegation-token handling Authorisation and its integration with an external policy provider, including how a cached policy decision is refreshed and what happens when the cache is stale Impersonation and proxy-user handling, where the engine executes work on behalf of somebody else The metadata path through the Hive Metastore, including everything Impala trusts from metadata it did not create The scan layer and every file format reader: Parquet, ORC, Avro, text and the compression codecs behind them, all running as native code over files a user can place in a table location User-defined functions, covering both the native and the JVM paths and the loading of a binary named by a session The per-daemon debug web interfaces and everything reachable from them, including the query profiles and logs they expose Scratch directory and spill-to-disk handling, and the credentials held for object storage Out of scope Adversaries and scenarios the project's own threat model places outside its trust boundaries Hadoop, Ranger, the Hive Metastore and the object stores Impala reads, where Impala is only the client Cloudera's distribution and its platform-specific patches, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the Apache release A cluster deliberately run without authentication or with the debug web interfaces published to an untrusted network, which is a deployment decision Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Impala's own use of the dependency makes them reachable Resource exhaustion from a query the cluster was sized for Most-valued findings Authorisation defects where Impala's cached metadata or cached policy disagrees with the authoritative state, so a user reads a table or a column that was revoked. This is the seam the shared high-severity pair CVE-2025-10702 and CVE-2025-10703 sits nearest, and both were assigned to Hive as well Memory corruption in the scan layer reachable from a data file. This is a C++ engine reading Parquet and ORC that ordinary users can write into a table location, so an out-of-bounds write is a primitive on a cluster node Anything reachable on a daemon's HTTP or Thrift surface without valid credentials, including the debug web interfaces that expose query profiles and logs Impersonation and proxy-user defects, where the engine runs work as an identity the caller should not be able to assume User-defined function loading that pulls a binary from a location the caller controls and executes it as the daemon's account Trust between the daemons, where a coordinator, catalog service or state store acts on an instruction from an unauthenticated peer Disclosure of query results, table data or storage credentials through profiles, logs or spilled scratch files Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] , Impala's listed contact in the ASF project directory. Name Impala clearly in the subject Read the repository's SECURITY.md before you start. It is a full threat model rather than a reporting policy, and it defines the trust boundaries a finding is measured against There is no money at any severity. The ASF runs no bug bounty as a foundation-wide position Do not open a public GitHub issue or pull request describing the vulnerability before the fixed release ships Say which daemon the finding lands on and whether it needs an authenticated session. The coordinator, the catalog service and the state store expose different surfaces and different levels of trust Check whether the finding also reproduces against Hive. The two projects share metadata and authorisation paths, and the recent high-severity pair was assigned to both Give the file that triggers it where the bug is in a reader. Impala executes in C++ over Parquet and ORC, so a malformed file is a real input Disclosure Handled under the ASF process: private report to the security team, embargoed fix with the maintainers, then a public advisory and a CVE alongside the release carrying it. Impala publishes through the ASF and NVD rather than as GitHub advisories. Cloudera backports into its own platform releases on a separate schedule, so hold the detail until the upstream announcement at least. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability